IAEA: Iran in Breach

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Today, the IAEA reported that Iran, in open defiance of the UN, is steadily expanding â€â€? rather than freezing â€â€? its efforts to enrich uranium. Worse still, according to David Albright (a former inspector who is now president of the Institute for Science and International Security), they are installing centrifuges “faster than was commonly expected.â€Â?

The complete report from the IAEA Board of Governors is available here. This is the summary, with my emphases:

    26. Pursuant to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, Iran has been providing the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with such material and facilities.

    27. The Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. The Agency remains unable, however, to make further progress in its efforts to verify fully the past development of Iran’s nuclear programme and certain aspects relevant to its scope and nature. Hence, the Agency is unable to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless Iran addresses the long outstanding verification issues through the implementation of the Additional Protocol (which it signed on 18 December 2003, but has not yet brought into force) and the required transparency measures.

    28. Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities. Iran has continued with the operation of PFEP. It has also continued with the construction of FEP, including the installation of cascades, and has transferred UF6 to FEP. Iran has also continued with its heavy water related projects. Construction of the IR-40 Reactor, and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant, are continuing. In contrast, there has been no indication of reprocessing related activities at any declared sites in Iran.

    29. As underscored by the Director General at the meeting of the Board of Governors in November 2006 (GOV/OR. 1174, paras 86–94), given the existence in Iran of activities undeclared to the Agency for 20 years, it is necessary for Iran to enable the Agency, through maximum cooperation and transparency, to fully reconstruct the history of Iran’s nuclear programme. Without such cooperation and transparency, the Agency will not be able to provide assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran or about the exclusively peaceful nature of that programme.

Continued at American Future.